A bombed building in Kyiv, February 25, 2022 - © Drop of Light/Shutterstock

A bombed building in Kyiv, February 25, 2022 - © Drop of Light/Shutterstock

The point of view of a human rights activist from Kyiv on the current state of the conflict and future prospects

07/04/2022 -  Roman Hromyk*

After the 40th day of Russia’s attempt to destroy Ukraine we have approached the time when the prospects of a truce are visible. Despite the ongoing heavy fighting, discovery of Russia’s massacre of civilians in Kyiv suburbs, and daily shelling of Ukrainians cities, both Ukraine and Russia report gradual progress of the negotiations as both sides find it increasingly difficult to keep up with active fighting on multiple fronts.

The Kremlin has been vocal about the goals of its aggression from the very first day of this latest episode of war against Ukraine. The evolution of the goals, articulated by Putin himself and his spokespeople, illustrates the changing perception of how things are going for them in Ukraine, globally, and inside Russia. The shrinking of the ambitions of the Kremlin reflects the likely miscalculation of their power that they now are aware of. Russia not only underestimated the unity, power, and qualification of Ukrainian defenders and society, but also the response of the international community has been much more decisive and unified too. With heavily weakened and demoralised troops involved in the attack on Ukraine, increasingly crippled economy, and Ukraine being as motivated to counterattack as ever, the continuation of a meaningful offensive seems problematic.

The effect of sanctions, primarily the mass exodus of global business from the Russian market, has finally started making more and more ordinary Russians unhappy with the war, albeit mildly. In other words, Putin most likely will not oppose stopping this war soon, and this is why the rhetoric is changing when it comes to Russia’s goals.

No longer does the Kremlin want to get rid of Zelensky and his government to replace them with loyal proxies. No longer do Russians articulate the need to “denazify” Ukraine. They still mention the plan to completely “demilitarise” Ukraine, but do not be shocked if in the coming days they will stop mentioning that goal or will declare it as a completed task. Given the extremely high price Russia has been paying for this likely miscalculated aggression, the very important question to ask is “What does Putin ultimately want?”.

Answering this question will help Ukraine and the international community be better prepared for the future rounds of negotiations and talks.

Despite Russia struggling to meaningfully continue the offensive against Ukraine militarily and despite Russia suffering a much harder hit on its economy than Moscow had hoped for, Putin is enjoying the show. He got himself to a position where he is negotiating the future of other countries, he is feared by the West (like in the good old days), he might be hated but he keeps receiving phone calls from the leaders of the free world. The brutality of his army’s attacks on civilians in Ukraine forces the West to speed up attempts to negotiate a truce. Putin’s life has become much more exciting since February 24th, 2022. He is no longer a president of a stagnant, underdeveloped, and authoritarian gas station-styled federation, he is suddenly Mr. Evil, he is discussed, feared, and hated, he is the person scaring the world with nuclear weapons and openly showing possible scenarios of occupying NATO members on his TV.

This means that Putin does not really mind if Zelensky and his government stay in power. He will likely also be fine with Ukraine receiving EU membership candidate status. In some ways, Ukraine as an EU member is even a more exciting prospect for him. The size and capability of Ukraine’s military will also be something he will probably be ready to accept a compromise on.

What he ultimately wants is to finish this war in a way that will allow him to do it again in the foreseeable future. Putin wants to make sure he can take a break, recover Russia’s economy, reequip the army, and most importantly fix the errors made in his plan for this war.

For Putin’s wish to come true, two things must happen. First of all, Ukraine must remain outside NATO. The next time he is ready to attack, Ukraine, again, must rely only on financial assistance and a limited defensive weapons supply as it does this time. Putin wants to make sure that if he attacks again, no other country will be there to fight alongside Ukrainians.

For that purpose he will be ready to sign any kind of security guarantee. Such an agreement may as well include a third party (e.g. USA, Poland or Turkey) that will promise to immediately supply Ukraine with defensive weapons, equipment, and financial support, were Ukraine to be attacked again. Such an agreement would not be a problem for Putin. The next time he will be better prepared both in terms of military power and ability to endure sanctions.

The second precondition for him to be able to repeat an offensive on Ukraine is the international community allowing Putin to avoid proper accountability for this war. Ability to slowly resume trade and a relationship with the West while ignoring eventual verdicts by international courts and tribunals, without having to pay reparations for the colossal damages Ukrainians have suffered is exactly what he needs.

The wording of the Kremlin’s goals and demands for a truce may and most likely will change in the coming days, but the ultimate goal will remain the same.

That is why the leaders of the free world, including Zelensky, must make sure they find enough resources to make sure Putin’s wish does not come true.

If it is about NATO membership, individual countries that are opposed to enlargement of the alliance to Ukraine must openly state what their opposition is based on. NATO needs to identify particular things that need to be fixed, particular reforms that still need to be implemented, set a timeline and a performance monitoring mechanism, and let Ukraine start the work.

Refusing Ukraine a right to become a member on the basis of “not wanting to make Russia feel threatened” would be an open declaration of giving up NATO's founding principles. Western leaders and Putin himself would know very well NATO has never been and will never be a threat to Russia’s security.

Russia as a country and individual decision-makers, including Putin, must pay a full price for the atrocities in Ukraine. They must respect and execute the verdicts of international courts and tribunals and pay all the court-ordered reparations to Ukraine. Only these actions can be the foundation for lifting the current sanctions.

This approach to negotiations and post-war relations between Ukraine, Russia, and the international community will provide security for the world. It is already clear to the majority of NATO members that Russia will not stop at just Ukraine if it is allowed to go back to business as usual with their primary goal fulfilled.

*Roman Hromyk is a human rights activist from Kyiv. The assessment of Russia's approach and ambition in this article is purely the author's personal opinion based on the interpretation of open source materials, is not based on any confidential intelligence, and does not represent the position of any organisation to which l author is or has been associated. The article was translated into Italian by Giulia Pilia, co-founder of Meridiano 13 , a multimedia publishing project by young researchers and experts that collects content and insights on those territories that extend east of this meridian.


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